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Our results allow us to point to a good number of
substantive findings with regard to inventory investment,
capital expenditures, and capital expenditure plans and
realizations. Inventory investment showed a very clear relationship to
efforts to maintain some "equilibrium" or previous average of ratios
of inventory sales in the face of changing expected demand. Capital
expenditures were estimated primarily as a distributed lag function
of a set of seven current and past actual sales changes, current and
lagged profits, and depreciation charges. The bulk of net investment
in plant and equipment was found to be accountable to increases in
sales, with a "hump" in the distribution at a one year lag. The sales
change coefficients were usually less in time series than in cross
sections and generally summed to no more than 0.5 in individual
firm regressions, rather than the unitary elasticity of capital stock to
sales that might be expected from homogeneous production func-
tions of the first degree, unitary elasticity of expectations, isoelastic
shifts in demand, and sufficient time for adjustment.
Coefficients were higher, however, in regressions where observa-
tions were industry means rather than the individual firm data. It
appeared that in some instances—where an essentially transitory
variance was averaged out, expectational factors were taken into
account, pressure of demand on capacity was high, and longer run
adjustment was permitted—sums of sales change coefficients did
approach a reasonable neighborhood of unity. (This should not be
taken to imply rejection of the possibility of increasing returns to
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variables.Differe might have contributed to sums of sales change coefficients of less penditure anticip than unity.) for means of o)c As to profits, immediately past profits generally showed a positive
tended to wash 01 associationwith capital expenditures, particularly in time series, less The capital
soincross sections.This suggests that itisin the timing of ence between a investment rather than in its long-run magnitude that profits play a positive associati greater part. Further tests indicated that higher gross profits tended stances as measu to accelerate the speed of adjustment of capital stock to increasing ence between ac sales. There was also some evidence of a greater impact of past capital profits in relatively smaller firms, variables reflecti Profits, further, also have a role in connection with the acceler- account in antici ation principle. Since profits prove to be a sharply positive function zero or slightly
of sales changes, positive profits coefficients in investment functions, information ente: which are particularly noted in time series relations, enlarge the cantly to the impact of sales changes on investment. Sales changes hence affect inferred confirm investment not only directly but also indirectly, via their impact on Modigliani, a con profits. The estimated total elasticity of capital stock to sales thus power for indivi does rise somewhat above 0.5 in individual firm regressions and there) which tool proves close to unity in some industry regressions. Anticipations Individual firm McGraw-Hill responses regarding the proportions while generally of capital expenditures for replacement and modernization versus short-run plans those for expansion enabled us to confirm findings by Feldstein and seriously Foot that expenditures for replacement and modernization were not one-third. When a constant proportion of capital (although much more constant than past sales change expenditures planned for expansion). The evidence did not suggest or anticipations that replacement and modernization expenditures were a stabilizing some commitme force, inasmuch as they tended to move up and down with expansion captured in ongii expenditures. And, as might have been expected, expenditures for minants. expansion related more clearly to past and expected sales changes, As we warned while replacement and modernization expenditures tied in more be found largely closely with previous depreciation charges and profits. expectations at ti Our rather lengthy analysis of capital expenditure anticipations the main, our d and realizations confirms that anticipations have essentially the same current and past i
determinantsas the expenditures to which they relate. Some differ- The
ences between expenditures and anticipations can be explained by past to understa
changes in these determinants between the time anticipations or consideration of
plans are expressed and the time they are implemented. Anticipated surveys. There w
capital expenditures themselves conform to an adaptive mechanism, expectations of t
manifesting a positive relation with the difference between current recently experien
actual expenditures and their previously expressed anticipations. tions of sales dec
Short-run capital expenditure anticipations account for a major this regressive ele
share of the variance of capital expenditures both across firms and apparently view
over time, far more than do previous capital expenditures or otherA Final Note191
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variables. Differences between capital expenditures and capital ex-
penditure anticipations of individual firms were substantial, but less
for means of observations within years or industries. Aggregation
tended to wash out errors in anticipations.
The capital expenditure realizations variable—that is, the differ-
ence between actual and anticipated expenditures—showed some
positive association with favorable or improving economic circum-
stances as measured by sales changes, sales realizations (the differ-
ence between actual and expected sales), and profits. In relations
involving capital expenditures or capital expenditure realizations,
variables reflecting conditions that should have been taken into
account in anticipations usually had coefficients that were close to
zero or slightly negative. Current variables, which postdated the
information entering into anticipations, generally contributed signifi-
cantly to the explanation of capital expenditure realizations. We
inferred confirmation of the realizations function proposed by
Modigliani, a confirmation of moderate proportions where predictive
power for individual firms was concerned (although distinct even
there) which took on greater weight at more aggregative levels.
Anticipations of capital expenditures three and four years ahead,
while generally found to have determinants similar to those of
short-run plans and of actual capital expenditures themselves, were
seriously incomplete and understated actual expenditures by almost
one-third. When fitted into regressions involving complete sets of
past sales change and profit variables, however, stated long-run plans
or anticipations were found to embody additional information or
some commitment or independent influence on expenditures not
captured in original or subsequent, more proximate, objective deter-
minants.
As we warned initially, determinants of business investment are to
be found largely in expectations—and probability distributions of
expectations at that—of future conditions and opportunities. Yet in
the main, our data, and a fortiori those of others, have involved
current and past variables.
The difficulties of relying heavily on simple extrapolations of the
past to understand or predict the future were presaged in our
consideration of the sales expectation responses of the McGraw-Hill
surveys. There we confirmed a significant regressive component in
expectations of the year-to-year sales changes. Where firms had most
recently experienced sales increases, they tended to report expecta-
tions of sales declines, and vice versa. At the industry level, however,
this regressive element tended to wash out. In effect, individual firms
apparently view much of their own short-run variation in sales as192 Factors in Business investment
transitory. Where mean sales of an entire industry group vary, firms
in the group will view the variances as in larger part permanent or
related to a long-run trend.
Long-run sales expectations manifested little of the regressive
relation and more of the positive association with past experience.
But for both long- and short-run sales change expectations, realiza-
tions were Apparent overall accuracy of short-run expecta-
tions masked wide, but offsetting, errors for individual firms and
years. Cross section relations suggested a positive association between
actual and expected long-run sales changes, as firms whose sales were
increasing more rapidly than sales of other firms generally expected
such a pattern to continue. Clearly, firms in more rapidly growing
industries expected to grow more rapidly than those in less rapidly
growing industries.
Firms were conspicuously inaccurate in predicting the timing of
long-run changes in sales. Neither information from individual firms
nor that from the means of firm observations for industries seemed
of much use as forecasts of whether sales changes over the next three
or four years would be greater or smaller than sales changes over any
other three or four year period. Thus, business firms are no better at
predicting cyclical fluctuations than economists or other observers and
analysts. That, in turn, sheds some light on our general difficulty in
predicting investment, which, for profit-maximizing firms, must
depend on precisely those unpredictable future changes in demand.
As Keynes pointed out in the General Theory (1936), the lack of
solid information as to the future leads, on the one hand, to ready
acceptance of the conventional wisdom of the moment and some
tendency to assume, for want of better information, that tomorrow
will be like today. On the other hand, it leads to substantial
instability of expectations when the conventional wisdom is jarred
and, consequently, to sharp and galloping adjustments of factors
entrepreneurs think themselves able to control. Therefore, marginal
efficiencies of investment, lag structures, and investment itself may
all change in abrupt and relatively unpredictable fashion.
We may conjecture that it is these underlying expectational issues
as much as omitted variables and ill-fitting functional forms that
contribute both to the persistently large proportions of unexplained
variance and to the differences in parametric estimates from different
structurings of frequently identical samples. Thus, changes in sales
and expected changes in sales prove major determinants of capital
expenditures and investment in inventories. This is consistent with
flexible accelerator models that have been developed and worked
with over a number of years now. Yet clearly the covariance of ex
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ante and ex post variables may be different in time series than in
cross sections and different for observations of individual firms than
for those that are means for broad industry groups.
We have chosen to put this in terms of differing components of
"transitory" and "permanent" variance in the different decomposi-
tions of our data sets. In the case of capital expenditures, we look for
a greater covariance between permanent changes in sales and invest-
ment; inventories may move relatively more with less permanent
changes. But more generally,the frequent differences between
estimates from time series and cross sections, individual firms and
industries, may well be generalized further. Wherever (as is so often
the case in empirical work in econometrics) the variables for which
we have observations are not precisely those that fit a correct
specification of the relation we wish to estimate, the resultant errors
in variables will effect different proportions of variance and covari-
ance in different structurings of the data. In our analysis, these
differences have been brought forth again and again. This should
affect our confidence not only toward the estimates presented here,
but perhaps even more toward anyone else's estimated parameters,
whether for investment functions or for other relations where those
potential differences have not been revealed.
In conclusion, we should recognize, along with what we have
attempted and accomplished, what we clearly have not: We have not
here completed the nexus of the saving-investment relation in the
economy.
For one thing, we have focused exclusively on business investment
and on that in plant, equipment, and inventories only. We have
ignored the larger amounts of physical capital formation in govern-
ment and households, as well as human capital formation in all
sectors.' And even within the business sector, we have considered
only those components of investment included in the most conven-
tional definitions and have excluded, inparticular, nonphysical
investment in research and development.2
Further, we have viewed business investment essentially from the
demand side, with supply factors entering at best implicitly in some
of the lag processes. There has been no attempt to come to grips here
with implications of the simultaneous saving function, which may in
the long run,if not in the short run as well, be decisive in
determining aggregative investment. Where underemployment and
idle capacity are substantial, there may be considerable play in the
'See Eisner (1978).
2Analysis of the McGraw-Hill data on research and development has been
reported upon by Rasmussen (1969).194 Factors in Business Investment
determinantsof business investment focused upon in this work. Ap
Under conditions of full employment and full utilization of produc-
tive factors generally, expansion of business investment will clearly
be limited by the elasticities of consumption, government demand,
and other forms of investment. If none of these can "give," there is Gk
noscope for general expansion of business investment on the basis of
the variables we have considered.3
Our own analysis of elements determining business investment
may perhaps be noted as much for its caveats as for its positive
findings. The role of the acceleration principle, distributed in its
and sometimes subtle in its process and interaction with profits, does
come through strongly. But the tricky wicket of expectations leaves
some parameter estimates, like predictions of future behavior, less
robust and certain than we might like.
Our caveats relate ultimately to the problem, more general than
many investigators acknowledge, of fitting data on essentially proxy
variables to those of our theoretical specifications and, proximately, Symbol
to an occasionally embarrassing abundance of statistical inferences
and parametric .estimates. Indeed, a novelty of this work that should D53
be emphasized is the very variety of estimates of parameters, from d53 =
varioustime series and cross sections, at different levels of aggrega-
tion, of the same basic body of data. In some instances, we have D offered explanations of the significant differences. But in many =t
cases,these, and all of the broad sets of results, both in the text and t
on microfiche, invite further conjecture and analysis.
3See, on this subject, Eisner (1968), andTaubmanand Wales (1969). /StSr'
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